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Abstract
In 1977, the John Lewis Partnership (JLP) was blacklisted for breaching the
Labour government’s pay controls under the Social Contract. As the Callaghan
administration struggled to establish economic credibility, extending its reach
into the private sector emerged as a political priority. JLP became a test case of
government resolve months before the Ford strike of autumn 1978 that ushered in
the Winter of Discontent. This article uses JLP records to create a more nuanced
picture of the tensions, contestations, and vacillations of pay policy in the late
1970s. By doing so, gaps between policy conception and implementation emerge
and intersect; both the business and the government faced constraints in
implementing policy, despite powerful beliefs about the integrity of their actions.
The article is not primarily a case study, however, and aims to contribute to
broader debates. The constitutional significance, rather than the commercial
impact, of government sanctions became a keynote of critique of JLP’s
blacklisting, suggesting that contemporaries recognized this was a confrontation
of the political moment between the state and the private sector. By looking from
a business’s perspective, we also gain insight into how organizations approached,
negotiated with, and responded to the government. Recovering the JLP
blacklisting episode further shows how business archives offer great promise
as resources for political history.
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IIn 1978, the John Lewis Partnership (JLP) found itself headline news
not, as its late founder John Spedan Lewis might have imagined, as an
exemplar of industrial democracy but as a company blacklisted for
breaching government pay controls. Post-war governments had sought
to freeze or restrain pay rates, whether by persuasion, admonition, or
statutory force, to curb inflation and sustain full employment. To have a
policy on incomes—although it was wages rather than all incomes that
came under sustained discipline—was to have a vital tool in the
economic toolkit, even if reluctantly implemented; nineteen incomes
policies of some kind can be identified between 1945 and 1979, making
such efforts ‘one of the most important and problematic features of
post-war British politics’.1
The 1974 Labour government had been elected on a promise of
bringing the trades union into voluntary co-operation (‘which is the
only way it can be done for any period in a free society’) to ‘make the
whole [incomes] policy successful’.2 For both Harold Wilson and his
successor, James Callaghan, incomes policy ‘commanded a large
amount of policy time and the energies and imagination of those,
policymakers and others, who were involved’.3 The first phase of the
‘new social contract’ with the Trades Union Congress (TUC), a £6 flat
cash limit, was implemented in July 1975, nine months after Wilson had
secured a small Parliamentary majority through a second general
election.4
The reach of government policy was, unsurprisingly, more assured in
the public than in the private sector, and it was the former that saw
wage restraint most consistently implemented and with greater severity
throughout the post-war period.5 Yet for it to be plausible that pay
restraint was a matter of national interest, both public and private
sectors had to observe the limits and be seen to do so. Finding levers to
influence private-sector pay—to deter and to punish—was therefore
vital to the political and economic integrity of Labour’s incomes policy.
Sanctions on private companies would be exercised through three key
mechanisms. The first was price control. The Price Commission had
been established by Edward Heath’s Conservative government through
1 P. Dorey, Wage Politics in Britain: The Rise and Fall of Incomes Policies since 1945
(Brighton, 2001), 1–3. See also: R. Jones, Wages and Employment Policy, 1936-1985 (London,
1987).
2 I. Dale, ed. Labour Party General Election Manifestos 1900-1997, Vol. 2 (London, 2015),
188–9.
3 M. J. Artis and D. P. Cobham, Labour’s Economic Policies 1974-1979 (Manchester, 1991),
273.
4 ‘The Attack on Inflation’, Cmnd 6151 (London, 1975). References to ‘phases’ below
are to the annual limits set on pay increases under the Social Contract.
5 A. Booth, The British Economy in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke, 2001), 146.
2 of 26 ALIX R. GREEN
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/tcbh/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/tcbh/hw
y056/5310009 by guest on 28 M
arch 2019
the 1973 Counter-Inflation Act to review and, if necessary, to prevent
companies increasing prices to consumers; its powers were extended
and revised under Wilson and Callaghan. The government could,
second, withdraw access to industrial assistance, such as subventions
and export credit guarantees. Finally, it could prohibit public bodies,
including the nationalized industries, from contracting with blacklisted
suppliers. JLP was particularly concerned with the final restriction; local
health authorities, universities, local government, and the National Coal
Board were among those refusing contract renewals or rejecting tenders
from the Partnership.
Blacklisting was a policy fraught with difficulties of design and
implementation. Assessing the pay settlements of companies from
small, local firms to major national corporations consumed the time of
ministers and officials. Further, sanctions could only work if govern-
ment departments ensured their dependent agencies acted as enforcers:
Health and Social Security (DHSS) the hospitals, Education and Science
the universities, and so on. The degree of pressure applied by
departments tended to follow their ministers’ personal commitment to
the policy, with the DHSS under David Ennals adopting the most
zealous approach.6 Further, the policy sat within a voluntary framework
of restraint; the government had no direct legal redress should
businesses refuse to comply. What semblance of coherence remained
was disrupted by the politics of pay. Some companies proved too
prominent and too precarious in terms of industrial relations to
sanction, the most notable being Ford. Having exceeded pay limits the
previous year without penalty, a strike in the autumn of 1978
culminated in a 17 per cent increase being offered by the automotive
company and accepted by the unions. It was so significant a breach of
the 5 per cent norm that it could not be ignored, yet the attempt to
apply sanctions only revealed how ineffective the government’s levers
over the private sector were.
On 13 December, a Conservative amendment declining to support
the ‘arbitrary use of economic sanctions’ was carried by six votes,
effectively placing private-sector pay outside government control.
‘Tonight’s vote might not be a vote of confidence but ‘‘this is it,’’’
Callaghan had told Labour rebels earlier in the day: ‘this was ‘‘the
effective end of the government’’’.7 His administration could now only
pursue its policy of pay restraint in the public sector, and those workers
had no inducement to comply. Five million working days were lost to a
series of strikes in pursuit of settlements of up to 40 per cent, and the
‘Winter of Discontent’ of 1978–1979 has acquired an enduring place in
6 ‘How Shirley & Co Launched Blacklist’, Daily Mail, 7 February 1978.
7 B. Donoughue, Downing Street Diary (London, 2008), 400.
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public, political, and academic imaginations.8 A direct line is easily
drawn between the Ford strike, through the Winter of Discontent, to the
collapse of consensus politics and the rise of Thatcherism in textbooks,
but even more nuanced accounts and scholarly reappraisals acknow-
ledge the significance of the sanctions defeat.9
The JLP was an unlikely malefactor in this story, but the forgotten
history of its blacklisting brings new shading to what can appear a
straightforward account of government overreach and policy failure.
From the initially courteous, later exasperated, correspondence with
Treasury and Department of Employment officials from the summer of
1977, the Partnership had become a ‘test case of government intentions’
by February of the following year.10 JLP found itself blacklisted for
breaching Phase 2 of the Social Contract, with 299 clerical and
secretarial and 149 specialist selling posts receiving on average £1.50
above the government limits. As a whole, the company added £27,000,
or 0.002 per cent, to its paysheet.11 The contravention was so small as to
be ludicrous; it perfectly captured for critics and commentators the
government’s inability to discipline the private sector, caricatured in the
Economist as ‘a genteel spanking. . . behind closed doors and with
trousers on’.12 Comic value was added by the image of John Lewis—
that familiar and trusted High Street institution—joining the govern-
ment’s rogues’ gallery. As Peter Walker, Conservative MP and former
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, wryly put it: ‘beware of any
nationalised industry boss caught Christmas shopping in Peter
Jones. . .’13
The joke, as ever, pointed to an important reality. The John Lewis
controversy exposed the inconsistencies and tensions in both the
conception and the implementation of sanctions policy, and with that
the brittle and contingent nature of the government’s credibility. The
stance taken by the Partnership once the affair became public—
including instructing a Queen’s Counsel to advise on the constitutional
significance of government sanctions—was crucial to an emerging
8 J. Shepherd, Crisis? What Crisis? The Callaghan Government and the British ‘Winter of
Discontent’ (Manchester, 2016), 4–5; T.M. Lo´pez, The Winter of Discontent: Myth, Memory,
and History (Liverpool, 2014).
9 A. Reitan, The Thatcher Revolution: Margaret Thatcher, John Major, Tony Blair, and the
Transformation of Modern Britain, 1979-2001 (Lanham, MD, 2003); Dorey, Wage Politics in
Britain, 167–71; Shepherd, Crisis? What Crisis?; Colin Hay, ‘Chronicles of a Death Foretold:
The Winter of Discontent and Construction of the Crisis of British Keynesianism’,
Parliamentary Affairs, 63 (2010), 446–70.
10 Elliott, ‘How Shirley & Co Launched Blacklist’.
11 T. G. Andrews, Letter to R. Le Guen, 28 July 1977, Box 2125/a, JLPA; to M. Pierson, 2
February 1978, Box 2125/a, JLPA. Andrews became Director of Personnel in 1967, taking
on the additional role of Deputy Chairman in 1972. He ceded the former role to S. C. May
in 1978.
12 ‘Rule by No Law?’, Economist, 11 February 1978.
13 ‘Publish Secret Sanctions List’ Demands Tory’, Daily Telegraph, 5 December 1977.
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narrative of abuse of power gaining political traction. The ‘blacking’ of
John Lewis set the scene in important ways for the confrontation and
crisis that defined the final stages of the Callaghan government.
JLP’s distinctive arrangements and organizational culture made it a
compelling case at the time, and the company has continued to draw
the attention of politicians, journalists, and academics.14 On taking
managerial control of Peter Jones in 1914—a drapery business acquired
in 1905 by his father John Lewis, Senior—Spedan Lewis began his
‘experiment in industrial democracy’.15 Over the following years, he
brought in shorter working days, increases in paid holiday, a
representative staff council, an internal newspaper, and profit-sharing
through Partnership Benefit. The written Constitution of the JLP, first
published in 1928, gave its ultimate purpose as ‘the happiness of all its
members, through their worthwhile and satisfying employment in a
successful business’; those members were, and remain, Partners, never
‘staff’ or ‘employees’.16 The Partnership was legally formed in 1929
following the signing of the First Trust Settlement and the transition to
employee ownership and what Spedan termed ‘producer co-operation’
was completed in 1950.
The Partnership had submitted copies of its Constitution as part of a
response to the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy convened
by Wilson in December 1975, which reported early in his successor’s
premiership.17 To then blacklist an exemplar of worker ownership and
participation seemed incongruous. The company’s ‘social responsibil-
ity. . . is well known to the public and its customers’, argued Kenneth
Baker, taking the opportunity to speak as constituency MP for the Oxford
14 The political appeal of JLP is demonstrated well by speeches given three days apart
during the 2010–2015 coalition government by the Liberal Democrat Deputy Prime
Minister Nick Clegg and Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron. The Partnership
model as a conciliation of markets and social good could be invoked to detoxify big
business following the economic crash of 2008 but also to suggest the agenda-changing
potential of the coalition project itself: Nick Clegg, ‘Speech to City of London Corporation
and the Centre Forum Thinktank’ (16 March 2012); David Cameron, ‘Speech on ‘‘Moral
Capitalism’’ at New Zealand House’ (19 March 2012). Scholarly interest in JLP has tended
to come from sociology and economics: Keith Bradley and Saul Estrin, ‘Profit Sharing in
the British Retail Trade Sector: The Relative Performance of the John Lewis Partnership’,
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 40 (1992), 291–305; Derek Matthews, ‘The British
Experience of Profit-Sharing’, The Economic History Review, 42 (1989), 439–64; A. D.
Flanders, R. Pomeranz, and J. Woodward, Experiment in Industrial Democracy: A Study of
the John Lewis Partnership (London, 1968), was commissioned by the Partnership as part of
the 1964 jubilee celebrations. Written for a general readership: C. Kennedy, The Merchant
Princes: Family, Fortune and Philanthropy; Cadbury, Sainsbury and John Lewis (London, 2000).
15 J. S. Lewis, Partnership for All (London, 1948).
16 The 2018 change of name to ‘John Lewis and Partners’ for the department stores
(‘Waitrose and Partners’ for the grocery chain) accompanied by a major advertising
campaign, draws attention to the distinctive orientation of the company.
17 John Lewis Partnership Ltd. ‘Industrial Democracy Committee: Evidence from the
John Lewis Partnership Ltd.’ (1976), Box PJ 11/201, TNA.
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Street store during a Commons debate on government powers: ‘It is
extraordinary that a company of that standing, status and background
should be driven to the position to which it has been driven by
Government policy.’18 Yet the very reasons JLP served as a useful and
prominent exemplar for contemporary commentators and critics may
also explain why it subsequently slipped from view. Not only was the
breach a minor one, but it came from the relatively quiescent retail
sector.19 USDAW, representing shopworkers, was a small and a ‘good
union’, in the words of Callaghan’s adviser, Bernard Donoughue. Less
government energy was expended on its affairs—and it has received less
attention from historians and others—than, for example, the ‘barmy’
TGWU, then Britain’s largest with two million members.20
To recover the John Lewis blacklisting episode is not merely to add an
interesting case study from an unexpected source, however. The
government’s attempt to apply economic sanctions to back an ostensibly
voluntary policy—the ‘Sergeant Major’s idea of volunteering’ in the
words of the Partnership’s Director of Personnel—suggests the value of
looking at the private-sector side of incomes policy beyond the hegemonic
allure of the Ford strike. Individual companies may not have been
‘governing institutions’ in the way that employers’ associations, such the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), or the trades union were in
Middlemas’s analysis—co-opted into the function of government as a
way of conciliating potentially conflicting agendas to the national
interest.21 Yet, building on the insights of McCarthy and Thane on
voluntary associations, we can recognize how individual private
businesses moved outside corporatist structures to engage in policy
dialogue.22 John Lewis is one example of a company that did not work
extensively through the CBI or the Retail Consortium but pursued its own
relations with government and with receptive backbench Members of
Parliament (MPs). As the article will show, these efforts were not
narrowly conceived as protecting the Partnership’s commercial position
but often framed in terms of democratic principle, constitutional
propriety, and public good.
18 Kenneth Baker, ‘Speech: Commons Debate on Pay Policy (Government Powers)’, (7
February 1978), 1308–11.
19 J. Elliott, Conflict or Cooperation? The Growth of Industrial Democracy (London, 1978),
125.
20 Donoughue, Downing Street Diary, On USDAW (Union of Shop, Distributive and
Allied Workers), 23; on TGWU (Transport and General Workers’ Union), 369. Both unions
recruited at JLP with the acquiescence of senior managers, although the latter were
concerned throughout this period that the Partnership system be seen to offer more to
Partners than did the trades union to members (discussed further below).
21 K. Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society: The Experience of the British System since
1911 (London, 1979).
22 Helen McCarthy and Pat Thane, ‘The Politics of Association in Industrial Society’,
Twentieth Century British History, 22 (2011), 217–39.
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For these reasons, the study speaks to a number of fields of interest
beyond the immediate frame of reference provided by post-war
incomes policies, the Social Contract, and the Wilson–Callaghan
governments, all of which have continued to receive attention from
historians of contemporary Britain, labour relations, and economic
policy.23 Shifts in ideas about the role and reach of the state during the
twentieth century—from ‘liberal laissez-faire. . . to active state interven-
tion at mid-century’—make attempts to control the private sector of
relevance to histories of government, governance, and policymaking.24
This work includes the rhetorical dimensions of the exercise of political
power, most notably in Tomlinson’s recent publications.25 Rhetorical
strategies are also the concern of management and organization
scholars analysing how companies define and promulgate corporate
identity, manage reputations, and secure commitment, both internally
and externally.26 History and organization studies may remain ‘uneasy
bedfellows’, yet there is much productive work to be done to locate
businesses within historical frameworks and to integrate history’s
modes of thinking with social-science approaches to analysing company
cultures, practices, and processes.27
In mapping the connectivities of any study, we should be alive to the
ways in which scholarly concerns interact with those of constituencies
beyond our borders. Of particular relevance here is how the 2008
financial crisis and its legacies have brought the 1970s back into view.
Historians have started to reassess a decade characterized as ‘dismal
23 Peter Dorey, ’From a ‘‘Policy for Incomes’’ to Incomes Policies’, in The Labour
Governments 1964-1970 (Manchester, 2006); Glen O’Hara, ‘‘‘Planned Growth of Incomes’’
or ‘‘Emergency Gimmick?’’ The Labour Party, the Social Partners and Incomes Policy,
1964-70’, Labour History Review, 69 (2004), 59–81; Chris Rogers, ’From Social Contract to
‘‘Social Contrick’’: The Depoliticisation of Economic Policy-Making under Harold Wilson,
1974–75’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 11 (2009), 526–43; K.
Hickson and A. Seldon, New Labour, Old Labour: The Wilson and Callaghan Governments
1974-1979 (London, 2004).
24 N. Crafts, I. Gazeley, and A. Newell, eds, Work and Pay in 20th Century Britain
(Oxford, 2007), 2.
25 Jim Tomlinson, ‘British Government and Popular Understanding of Inflation in the
Mid-1970s’, The Economic History Review, 67 (2014), 750–68; J. Tomlinson, Managing the
Economy, Managing the People: Narratives of Economic Life in Britain from Beveridge to Brexit
(Oxford, 2017).
26 See for example: Dennis A. Gioia, et al., ‘Organizational Identity Formation and
Change’, The Academy of Management Annals, 7 (2013), 123–93; Davide Ravasi and Majken
Schultz, ‘Responding to Organizational Identity Threats: Exploring the Role of
Organizational Culture’, Academy of Management Journal, 49 (2006), 433–58.
27 Anna Greenwood and Andrea Bernardi, ‘Understanding the Rift, the (Still) Uneasy
Bedfellows of History and Organization Studies’, Organization, 21 (2014), 907–32; Mike
Zundel, Robin Holt, and Andrew Popp, ‘Using History in the Creation of Organizational
Identity’, Management and Organizational History, 11 (2016), 211–35; Martin Parker,
‘Contesting Histories: Unity and Division in a Building Society’, Journal of Organizational
Change Management, 15 (2002), 589–605.
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and benighted’ and to recast portrayals of its political leaders.28 Given
the prominence of incomes policies to the political landscape of this
decade, histories of business surely have important contributions to
make to these efforts. Yet these reappraisals and fresh perspectives are
more than academic exercises; they are in conversation with public uses
and imaginations of the past.29 Memories of the 1970s are being evoked,
invoked, and reinterpreted, often serving in media coverage and
political argument to underpin a diagnosis of and response to a
disordered present; by engaging actively with this ‘presence of the
past’, historians can help inform public debate and policy thinking.30
‘Policy’ can be read here as the administration of organizations as well
as of the state. The project of which this article is a part has been
collaboratively designed to feed into pay policy discussions within JLP
itself. For this purpose, a business history in celebratory mode is
unsatisfactory; it is in understanding that complex and shifting
interplay between commercial priorities and government interventions,
between company philosophies and practical pressures, between open-
ness and secrecy—among many others—that the potential for insight lies.
The study aims to do more, however, than to show the value of
using an individual company’s records for understanding the tensions,
contestations, and vacillations of pay policy during the 1970s. It also
suggests there is potential for integrating business archives more
systematically into historical research. Business history gives us
purchase on a full range of social, cultural, and moral, as well as
political and economic, questions, and so, for Daunton, ‘should not be
left to business historians. . .changing attitudes to corporate form and
responsibilities, and the relationship between the firm and urban
society are central to understanding modern Britain’.31 As Greenwood
and Ingram have recently argued, company archives are too often
overlooked or dismissed by social and cultural historians, ‘pigeonholed
as too self-serving of the businesses they represent, difficult to access, or
thought to be too dry in terms of their holdings’.32 Political history has,
28 L. Black, H. Pemberton, and P. Thane, eds, Reassessing 1970s Britain (Manchester,
2015), 2; in addition to previously cited works, see also: S. Ball and A. Seldon, The Heath
Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal (London, 2014).
29 The 1970s has received new attention in popular histories, for example: A. Beckett,
When the Lights Went Out: Britain in the Seventies (London, 2009); A. W. Turner, Crisis?
What Crisis? Britain in the 1970s (London, 2009).
30 A. R. Green, History, Policy and Public Purpose: Historians and Historical Thinking in
Government (London, 2016).
31 Martin Daunton, ‘The Future Direction of British History: Thinking About Economic
Cultures’, History Workshop Journal, 72 (2011), 225. From a US perspective see: Linda
Edgerly, ‘Business Archives Guidelines’, The American Archivist, 45 (1982), 267–72.
32 Anna Greenwood and Hilary Ingram, Sources and Resources. ‘The People’s
Chemists’: The Walgreens Boots Alliance Archive’, Social History of Medicine, 31 (2018),
857–69.
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similarly, much to gain from reframing assumptions and mispercep-
tions about business archives. If we are interested in the reach and
operation of government, then we can usefully attend to how
organizations sought to influence, advance, divert, or restrain policy
agendas.
The Partnership’s archive and heritage centre contain the rich
collections of a business invested in its own past.33 The emphasis on
openness and mutual obligations within the company ensured that the
Partnership created documents with a notable level of candour and
detail, including minutes and memoranda that are far from dry and
formulaic.34 Significant for this study is that boxes on the blacklist were
created at all, involving as it did the collation of documents that would
otherwise never have been filed, or read, together. These include
extracts from the company newspaper and democratic organ, the
Gazette; minutes of Principal Executive Committee meetings; internal
memoranda and briefings for managers; correspondence with govern-
ment departments, the Price Commission, MPs, and others; legal
advice; clippings from newspapers and Hansard, as well as transcripts
from TV and radio coverage.
Efforts to research the blacklisting are, of course, limited to the
documents that were selected for retention; there are gaps and silences
in the archives, one of which is how ‘ordinary’ Partners understood and
responded to their company’s blacklisted status.35 Yet the selectivity of
the records and the privileging of executive perspective function as
both caveat and catalyst for this study. As the article will show, the idea
of the ‘blacklist’ acquired a political valency that shaped conduct and
concerns in Parliament and the Partnership even as clear disjunctures
between the principles at stake—on both sides—and the implementa-
tion of the policy emerged. The blacklist boxes exist for historical study
today because, for the company leadership, the affair impinged on the
integrity of the Partnership system (even if Partners appear not to have
seen it as a matter of such consequence). By recovering this lost
33 The archive was established in 1964 as part of the Partnership’s jubilee—50 years
since Spedan Lewis beginning his ‘experiment in industrial democracy’ at Peter Jones
(also the centenary of the original Oxford Street store opened by John Lewis, Senior): E.
Shepherd, Archives and Archivists in 20th Century England (Farnham, 2016), 117.
34 ‘I am personally accountable to 25,000 Partners’, Andrews argued when complaining
of the Treasury’s dilatory handling of correspondence.
35 On gaps and silences in business archives, see: Stephanie Decker, ‘The Silence of the
Archives: Business History, Post-Colonialism and Archival Ethnography’, Management and
Organizational History, 8 (2013), 155–73. A small number of Partners exercised their right to
submit anonymous letters to the Gazette about the blacklist; eighteen were printed in
February 1978, the month John Lewis become headline news, but only seven letters were
received during the subsequent eleven months of JLP’s business year. Over this period,
more than 300 Partners in total wrote to the Gazette, the majority of whom sent a single
letter. On the role of journalism in the Partnership and on the value of anonymity, see:
Lewis, Partnership for All, ch. xxxv.
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significance, we open up a new point of access on a complex interplay
of arguments that extended beyond calculations of wage settlements or
inflationary trends into larger debates about the exercise of government
power and the accountabilities of the private sector.
II
The balancing of obligations to the government, the business, and their
staff was a long-standing challenge for the JLP executive. Spedan Lewis
certainly felt the tug of loyalty to country. He and his successor as
Chairman O. Bernard Miller recognized the claims of successive
governments to be working in the national interest when they sought to
control inflation through pay restraint during the post-war decades. At
the same time, they had to find ways to retain good Partners and
preserve principles of fairness ‘between workers of different kinds’; the
Partnership ‘could not carry its own patriotism to the length of letting
itself be outbid’ in pay rates (at least by ‘ordinarily good employers’).36
By the end of the 1960s, the company leadership could look back with
some measure of satisfaction at having managed these competing
imperatives through difficult times. The Partnership had come through
the combination of a six-month freeze and a further six months of
‘voluntary’ Severe Restraint following the 1966 Prices and Incomes Act
‘with remarkably little difficulty’. An exercise to raise the paysheet in 1965
had ensured that rates were ‘in advance of those of our competitors when
the freeze was imposed’.37 Provisions for permissible increases in the 1966
White Paper were then applied by JLP with the ‘greatest elasticity and
flexibility with which it could be interpreted’ to ensure fidelity to its own
pay policy.38 At the core of this policy was the reward of performance. The
formula of paying ‘the full, local, commercial rate and as much above that
as can be justified by performance’ had been crystallized in a new version
of the Partnership Rules (a section of the company’s written Constitution)
in 1965. It was also, however, the formula that was to bring the JLP into
conflict with the Wilson–Callaghan government.
The balancing act acquired new dimensions of difficulty from the
turn of the decade. By the time Heath’s Conservatives won the general
election in June 1970, the Partnership executive had already detected a
36 Chairman (J. S. Lewis), ‘Transport Pay. Your Memorandum 45379’, The John Lewis
Partnership Chronicle for Bon Marche, 1 August 1949, 302.
37 Director of Personnel, ‘Routine Report for Your Conference on 31st May, 1967. Pay
Freeze and Period of Severe Restraint’, ref. P/54,967 (26 May 1967), Box 2839/iv, JLPA.
38 Minutes of 608th Principal Executive Committee, (1 December 1966), Box 2839/d,
JLPA. The minutes note (paragraph 17,756) that increases were permissible for promotion,
substantially enhanced responsibility, and, in exceptional circumstances, ‘to attract or
retain manpower or on grounds of comparability to correct a gross anomaly’. See: ‘Prices
and Incomes Standstill: Period of Severe Restraint’, Cmnd 3150 (London, 1966).
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swift and significant ‘change in climate of pay’. The Chairman
expressed anxiety that the situation was ‘moving too rapidly elsewhere’
to wait until the company’s annual review of pay in September; JLP
should no more be undersold in pay rates than in selling prices.39 This
concern was partly a long-standing one about competition for staff with
companies such as Marks & Spencer. An increasingly confident
USDAW operation was a new factor, however, the union having
secured a pay settlement with the Cooperative Wholesale Society. It
was, as the Chairman put it: ‘of the utmost importance that the
Partnership should not be open to the criticism that Unions can do
better for their members’.40 Particular emphasis was placed on
improving women’s pay to a £14 minimum in the period immediately
after the 1970 Equal Pay Act was passed, efforts that tended to be
framed in terms of raising the status of the drapery trade relative to
other sectors or of upholding JLP’s ethos and morale.41
Executives had far less control, of course, over government policy
than company strategy. The archives contain no record of correspond-
ence between JLP and the Heath (or, later, the Wilson) administration,
yet internal documents show the Partnership maintaining its cautious
but confident approach to compliance. Stage 2 of Heath’s programme,
for example, stipulated that the increases should not exceed £1 per head
per week plus 4 per cent of the average pay bill per head. It was a rigid
policy, with little scope for fairness or unfairness in its application, as
Barbara Wootton—the sociologist, Labour life peer, and early analyst of
wages policy—argued in 1974.42 Nonetheless, the Partnership found
room for manoeuvre. The average wage bill calculation was, as the
Director of Personnel explained in an internal memorandum, ‘pretty
meaningless’ in the retail sector, with seasonal variations in staffing and
a large part-time workforce. The company therefore created a central
pool consisting of 90 per cent of the maximum allowable increase for all
staff paid less than £3,000, from which increases could be granted. This
approach mitigated the risk of an inadvertent breach, while also
cultivating the organizational narrative of pay for performance.43
39 Chairman (O. Bernard Miller), Memorandum to General Secretary, 27 May 1970, Box
2938/f, JLPA.
40 Chairman (O. Bernard Miller), Memorandum (extract) to General Secretary, 10 June
1970, Box 2938/f, JLPA.
41 See: Director of Personnel, Memorandum to General Secretary (for Principal
Executive Committee), 10 May 1971, Box 2839/f, JLPA; ‘Minutes of 22nd Meeting of the
Principal Executive Committee’, (20 May 1971), Box 2839/f, JLPA. ‘[T]he Partnership had
from time to time acted in the pay field because it thought something was right rather
than because of the competitive situation’: Minutes of 23rd Meeting of the Principal
Executive Committee, (27 May 1971), Box 2839/f, JLPA.
42 Barbara Wootton, Incomes Policy: An Inquest and a Proposal (London, 1974), 71.
43 Director of Personnel, Memorandum to All Spending Officers, ‘Partnership Policy
and Administration during Phase Two’, 2 March 1973, Box 2839/f, JLPA.
SECRET LISTS AND SANCTIONS 11 of 26
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/tcbh/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/tcbh/hw
y056/5310009 by guest on 28 M
arch 2019
The Partnership initially made accommodations of government
policy with relative ease, yet the efforts of the new Conservative
administration first to withdraw from regulating private sector pay,
then to seek a tripartite agreement with the TUC and CBI—Heath’s
famous ‘U-turn’—and finally to impose statutory controls, provided an
increasingly unsettled climate for the Partnership. Most notable among
the emerging concerns was how government intervention circum-
scribed the Partnership’s capacity to set its own agenda for pay. For JLP,
this was particularly troubling and disruptive; the rewards of
Partnership—seen in the round as take-home pay, the distribution of
profit through Partnership Benefit (as requested before, this is a specific
amenity awarded in the company), and other ‘amenities’ such as
subsidized holidays—were central to the company’s sense of itself.
Differentials based on merit, that is, the use of pay to recognize
performance, had emerged as the key precept of Partner reward.44 It
may have been a fiction that a large, hierarchical organization in a low-
wage sector can have a ‘range of pay. . . as wide as the range of ability’,
but this was nonetheless an expression of a powerful ideological
commitment.45 As government policy began to impinge on the
company’s ability to pursue this approach, it became a matter for
serious and sustained debate at the highest level of the business.
Government policy changes took up management time and reams of
paper were expended to cascade information through the network of
branches. Yet it was not the policies themselves—whether threshold
payments or caps on pay rises—that were the principal source of
executive concern. The Partnership was in a solid financial position and
amenable to calls for restraint on both prices and wages.46 What
preoccupied senior managers was how to comply. Answering that
question involved balancing a number of conflicting imperatives: to
follow the spirit as well as the letter of the law, to deal fairly with staff
at different levels, to maintain competitive position, and to uphold the
rule of paying market rate plus performance. Overlaying these concerns
was the need to explain their decisions to constituencies inside and
outside the business through narratives that conveyed and affirmed the
integrity of those decisions and so that of the Partnership itself.
The complexity of compliance for JLP is shown, for example, in
executive efforts to manage the effects of successive incomes policies on
44 Managers graded Partners annually from Grade 1 (‘exceptional’) to Grade 6 (‘poor’),
with Grade 4 (‘meets job requirements’) regarded as the local market rate. For those on
Grades 2–4, the achievement of targets offered ‘scope for further advance’; for those ‘few
who reached Grade 1 there would be unlimited scope’: Partnership Pay Review System,
17 July 174, Box 2839/d, JLPA.
45 Important Aspects of Personnel Policy, 1973–4. Box 577/f, JLPA. ‘Pay policy’ (2
January 1974), paragraph 3.
46 Minutes of the Central Board (Extract) (26 October 1972). Box 2839/d, JLPA.
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pay differentials between groups of Partners from 1972. Subsequent
analysis has pointed to a steady decline nationally in differentials over
the decade; the volume of complaint did not always align with actual
changes in wage distribution, but the concern was nonetheless ‘real and
widespread’.47 The erosion of differentials, actual or perceived, as a
consequence of government policy was problematic from the company’s
perspective. The policy of pay for performance allowed a wide pay range
to exist within a business owned by its members without major
ideological compromise. Any policy involving flat cash elements (under
Heath, ‘threshold’ payments triggered by increases in the Retail Price
Index, or the £6 limit under Phase 1 of Wilson’s Social Contract) acted to
compress differentials to the benefit of the Partnership’s lower-paid ‘rank
and file’.48 From a managerial perspective, however, the provision
undermined the company’s own system of performance review and
reward. At the other end of the payscale, the company faced commercial
pressures to attract and retain ‘high-calibre people’, for whom there was
less scope for increased remuneration within the constraints of national
policy.49 ‘Fairness’ was inescapably a contingent notion—even within a
Partnership—and government controls exposed and exacerbated the
difficulties of maintaining this fragile conciliation of equity and hierarchy.
It was a balance that required the business to delineate careful
explanations for the policymakers implementing wage controls. The
Partnership was, according to its own records, one of four firms in
breach of Phases 1 and 2 of the Social Contract. The first breach, in
1976, concerned ninety-seven of the highest-paid Partners, whose
salaries of over £5,000 were reviewed centrally rather than at branch
level; the majority of staff involved in the second—for which the
company was blacklisted in 1977–8—were clerical and secretarial. In
both cases, the company was effectively arguing for a disregard.
Defending the breach of Phase 1, the company Secretary insisted there
was no pay ‘settlement’ in JLP for groups of employees, as would have
been familiar to Price Commission staff from unionized workplaces.
The pay awards were presented in terms of correcting anomalies,
ensuring comparability, and rewarding performance; the company was
willing to show ‘deference to the Government’s anti-inflation policy’
but had limited tolerance for the ‘serious disadvantage to the
Partnership’ that was being incurred.50 No action was taken by the
government in response to this initial breach, which amounted to
47 W.H. Fishbein, Wage Restraint by Consensus: Britain’s Search for an Incomes Policy
Agreement, 1965-79 (London, 1984), 184–5.
48 ‘Rank and file’ was the company term in use at the time.
49 Director of Personnel to General Secretary for Members of PEC, 7 December 1976,
Box 2839/d, JLPA.
50 Secretary (B. E Dickinson), Letter to Price Commission Secretary, 9 June 1976, Box
2839/f, JLPA.
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£30,000, yet the second, smaller, breach was pursued attentively by
officials and became headline news. Seeking to explain this escalation is
the task to which the article now turns.
Callaghan had initially claimed the blacklist was a ‘figment of media
imagination’ in an interview for The World This Weekend on New Year’s
Day 1978. By February, however, an irresistibly ominous image of a
shadowy Cabinet sub-committee had taken shape, despite careful
ministerial footwork on the issue of secrecy in Commons debates.51
Indeed, the prospect of a clandestine blacklist was never knowingly
underplayed in the press. ‘We remember how the stench of Watergate
came, in part, from the covert use of Government powers against
recalcitrant citizens’ was the strident note sounded in one article
clipped by John Lewis at the time. The Sun was not to be outdone in
drawing historical parallels; a 7th February headline denounced ‘The
morality of Mussolini’, while the Star Chamber provided the Telegraph’s
preferred metaphor.52 The keynotes of the critique were twofold: that
the secret blacklist avoided Parliamentary scrutiny and that the
discretionary application of sanctions on a voluntary policy under-
mined the rule of law. The Leader of the Opposition, Margaret
Thatcher, had taken this line of attack in early 1976, presenting the
Social Contract as a violation of the Constitution; a future Conservative
government promised a return to true Parliamentary democracy.53
In the case of John Lewis, the secrecy of the blacklist extended to the
company itself. The question of JLP’s status was first posed in a letter
printed in the Gazette on 26 November 1977 from ‘An Interested
Partner’ who had been told of the blacklisting by a local authority
employee. The Director of Personnel responded: ‘If such a list exists,
and if the Partnership appears on it, we would expect to have been
informed officially by a Government department. . .we would have
protested most vigorously because in our opinion there is no valid
reason for any form of sanction against the Partnership’.54 The
proposed response, drafted 5 days previously, dismissed the letter as
51 ‘Secret Committee That Runs the Pay Policy’, The Times, 6 January 1978;
‘Government Blacklist of Companies in Breach of the Incomes Policy Continues to
Grow’, The Times, 9 October 1978; Elliott, ‘How Shirley & Co Launched Blacklist.’ Bernard
Donoughue refers in passing to EY(P) as the Cabinet committee on prices (rather than
pay): Donoughue, Downing Street Diary, 404. Callaghan mentions a Cabinet sub-committee
for pay policy meeting ‘at least twice a week for several hours’ by the winter of 1977: J.
Callaghan, Time and Chance (London, 1987), 472.
52 ‘Blacklist Justice’, Daily Telegraph, 6 February 1978.
53 Margaret Thatcher, ‘Speech to Conservative Trade Unionist Conference’, (28
February 1976); Robert Saunders, ‘‘‘Crisis? What Crisis?’’ Thatcherism and the
Seventies’, in Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders, eds, Making Thatcher’s Britain
(Cambridge, 2012), 34.
54 Letter and response printed in Gazette, 26 November 1977, 1,003. Letter dated 17
November.
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‘recounting local tittle tattle’,55 but a memo from the Managing Director
of Jessops in Newcastle confirming the debarring of the firm from a
National Coal Board contract appears to have intervened.56 Enquiries
with the Treasury extended into the New Year without resolution; the
Partnership eventually broke silence with a statement in the Gazette on
4 February (with copies sent to Baker as a local MP and to a Treasury
official), in which the company announced it was seeking legal opinion
on the government sanctions.
Internal documents from the same period suggest that neither lost
business nor reputational damage was a serious concern. Exclusion
from public sector contracts appears to have been an isolated
occurrence at this point. Being blacklisted was of ‘little importance. . .
commercially’ and may even have had reputational benefits. Customers
called and sent letters of support. The Financial Times named Chairman
Peter Lewis ‘Man of the Week’ 4 days after the first major Commons
debate on pay policy, noting the 21 per cent increase in department
store sales over the corresponding week in 1977.57 In this context, the
instruction of Counsel is an interesting step. Advice was requested from
Anthony Leggatt, QC on the release of secret directives sent to public
bodies to implement the blacklist, the potential for action by the Price
Commission, and the legal redress available to the company.58 The
instructions also, and most notably, sought advice on the broader
constitutional legitimacy of government sanctions.
The Counsel’s opinion carried the same rhetorical charge as
Parliamentary debate and political commentary: ‘This usurpation of
power by the Executive is of profound constitutional significance. If
permitted, it will enable the Government of the day to enforce its party
policies under the pretext of national interest without recourse to
Parliament’. Leggatt advised that Parliament—and not the courts—
provided the only real ‘solution’ to the ‘abuse of power’ the sanctions
represented: ‘it should not be necessary for individual Companies to
champion the constitutional cause of preventing it’.59 In framing its
involvement in the blacklist controversy in terms of challenging
constitutional impropriety, the Partnership drew on an emerging public
narrative of government misconduct and overreach—but also on long-
standing preoccupations within the company itself. In 1949, the
Partnership Council voted to allow those with a ‘preference for
55 Finance Director, Memorandum to Chairman, 21 November 1977, Box 2839/f, JLPA.
56 Jessops Managing Director, Memorandum to Director of Trading (Department
Stores), 24 November 1977, Box 2839/f, JLPA.
57 ‘John Lewis Trade Boost’ in Financial Times, 11 February 1978.
58 John Lewis Partnership Legal Department, Letter to QC Andrew Leggatt, February
1978, Box 2839/f, JLPA.
59 Counsel’s Opinion on the pay blacklist situation, 9 February 1978, Box 2125/b, JLPA.
Extract appeared in the Gazette, 18 February 1978, 47.
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totalitarianism’ to continue their membership only ‘so long as they did
not use it to work within the Partnership for any form of totalitarianism
in the national government’.60 Rule 49, which remained in effect until
2000, focused on ‘harm to the Partnership’s internal atmosphere or
external reputation’ rather than the overthrow of the Parliamentary
system.61 Yet the two were connected, at least for Spedan Lewis, who
had perceived the Partnership as involved in and committed to the
struggle to preserve British democracy. The subtitle to his second book,
Fairer Shares (1954)—‘a possible advance in civilisation and perhaps the
only alternative to Communism’—indicates where his anxieties lay.62
Counsel’s Opinion, which rejected the government’s appeal to the
national interest in imposing sanctions as ‘the justification of totalitar-
ianism. . . the knell which the bell of repression tolls’, resonated with
this line of thinking.63 There is no evidence that company executives
saw their actions as having direct political import, yet by (publicly)
rendering the legal advice a matter of constitutional propriety and
democratic principle, the company lent greater apparent cogency to
narratives critical of the government. Blacklisting was, of course, only
one story among many in the spring and summer of 1978—violence in
Northern Ireland, disintegration of the Lib-Lab Pact, and precarious
Social Contract negotiations with the TUC, among others—but it was a
story that served to nourish ideological opposition to Labour in the
months before the critical sanctions vote of December 1978 and then the
general election the following May.64
The decision to extend private-sector sanctions beyond the high
point of public controversy in February—and to withhold information
on blacklisted firms despite a Speaker’s ruling to the contrary65—points
to the complex political difficulty the administration was facing. The
constitutional challenge threatened the integrity of a national pay
policy, but the government could not be seen to apply the discipline of
restraint only to the public sector. Indeed, the blacklisting controversy
60 J. S. Lewis, Fairer Shares: A Possible Advance in Civilisation and Perhaps the Only
Alternative to Communism (London, 1954), 168.
61 For the version in effect during the blacklisting: The Constitution of the John Lewis
Partnership, (London, 1973), 34.
62 The title of this article, which came from a Partner’s letter to the Gazette, reflects
these anxieties: ‘Secret lists and sanctions it seems to me put this Government fairly and
squarely in the same bed as the Communists’: Letter from ‘McGork’, Gazette, 11 February
1978, 32.
63 Extracts from the Opinion were printed with comments from JLP’s Legal Adviser:
Pay guidelines, Gazette, 18 February 1978, 47.
64 The submission of a pastiche of Leigh Hunt’s Abou Ben Adhem to the Gazette suggests
that at least some Partners followed this line of argument. The final lines read, ‘Is there no
remedy to purge this hate?/ Must everlasting blackness be our fate?/ What can we do?
Nothing it seems unless/ The state itself be changed and will redress’: Letter from
‘Perplexed Partner’, Gazette, 10 June 1978, 440.
65 ‘Blacklist Secrecy to Stay’, Observer, 5 February 1978.
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was a threat to Callaghan partly because it exposed a fundamental
tension within his administration about the stance of a Labour
government towards business. The 1974 White Paper, The Regeneration
of British Industry, had set a conciliatory tone: ‘We need both efficient
publicly owned industries, and a vigorous, alert, responsible and
profitable private sector, working together with the Government in a
framework which brings together the interests of all concerned’.66 The
impetus had come from Wilson himself; Tony Benn may have been
Secretary of State for Industry, but the White Paper was drafted not by
his Department but by the No. 10 Policy Unit. It signalled a shift in
policy imperatives from the advance of state control over private
enterprise to the pragmatic pursuit of a mixed market economy.67 At
the same time, however, the government had to manage a fragile Social
Contract and be seen to deal equitably and cooperatively with the
trades union.
A lesson learned from Wilson’s first administration (1964–70),
perhaps, was the consequences to political credibility and public
confidence of apparent arbitrariness in the enforcement of incomes
policy. By 1971, Hugh Clegg—who had served on both the Donovan
Commission on industrial relations and the National Board for Prices
and Incomes, set up in 1965—had written the uncompromising post-
mortem. Selecting a few companies for ‘exemplary treatment’ while
leaving the worst offenders untouched had, he argued, ‘served only to
swell the general feeling that the policy was unfair’.68 Callaghan would
later face similar charges of procedural impropriety during the
blacklisting episode. He was subject, however, to a more clearly
articulated critique than his predecessor had been, involving both
‘political chicanery’ (to borrow Clegg’s term) in the application of
sanctions and suggestions of inconsistency or incompetence within his
administration. In the autumn of 1977, the phase three 10 per cent
maximum was contravened by Ford, Vauxhall, and Otis, who joined a
‘whitelist’ of companies known to be in breach but not subject to
sanctions.69 The Telegraph called ‘political jobbery’ on the Ford’s
decision, as it followed a commitment on the part of the company to
build a £180-m plant not far from Callaghan’s constituency in South
Wales.70 In the Parliamentary debates on counter-inflation policy over
the winter 1977–8, MPs across the House challenged disparities in the
application of sanctions. The Liberal MP John Pardoe talked of ‘the
66 ‘The Regeneration of British Industry’, Cmnd 5710 (London, 1974).
67 Hickson and Seldon, New Labour, Old Labour: The Wilson and Callaghan Governments
1974-1979, 77.
68 H. A. Clegg, How to Run an Incomes Policy: And Why We Made Such a Mess of the Last
One (London, 1971), 56.
69 ‘The Firms That Got Away with It’, Daily Mail, 10 February 1978.
70 ‘Blacklist Justice’.
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unfairness of not knowing whether it is size, geographical location or
political allegiance that counts’ in determining whether a firm is to be
‘clobbered’.71
The timing of these debates suited the Conservatives and gave them
the opportunity to make incursions into the tentative government
confidence brought by a dip in inflation into single digits. Extending
the Commons debates on pay policy in February 1978 served to divert
Parliamentary attention from the party’s persistent difficulties with the
issue of immigration. Ten days before the first major debate, Thatcher
had given an interview on World In Action, in which she talked of
people’s fears of being ‘rather swamped’ by Commonwealth migrants
(the other popular fear she mentioned was that of the trades union’s
irresponsible use of ‘industrial muscle’).72 The misdirection was not lost
on Labour; it was ‘better a blacklist than a blackamoor’ for the
Conservatives, as Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey put it.73
Nor did the newspapers miss the opportunity to send up both sides;
the Daily Mail cartoonist ‘Jon’ saw a turbaned shopkeeper turning away
a blacklist inspector with the words ‘no, thank you, I’m already on Mrs
Thatcher’s’.74
From the government’s perspective, however, all news was bad
news. Tory claims of constitutional impropriety amplified those of
Labour rebels about the impact on jobs, while the media duly coloured
in the picture of a growing political mess. A new intensity of focus fell
on blacklisting that had been absent for previous infractions, including
the Partnership’s. John Lewis was clearly not the same kind of ‘test
case’ as Ford, but the coverage of the Partnership’s blacklisting
mattered, as it perfectly captured a disjuncture between crime and
punishment. In a MAC cartoon of 6 February, Callaghan the mobster,
sledgehammer in hand, warns a roughed-up manager slumped by the
smashed windows of the Oxford Street store that ‘people who stick to
Big Jim’s pay limits get ‘‘protection’’ against this kind of thing
happening. . .’. Another alter ego for the Prime Minister was
Communist dictator, with Jak, the Evening Standard cartoonist, showing
the Chairman up against a wall, a Stalinesque portrait of Callaghan
over the boardroom table: ‘Come on, Mr Lewis, only finger-printing
and blood-letting left and then we can get down to signing the
contract’. Such cartoons had bite precisely because the department store
71 See: debate on Pay Policy (Government Sanctions), 13 February 1978, 90.
72 Margaret Thatcher, ’Tv Interview for Granada World in Action ("Rather Swamped")’,
<https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103485> accessed 5 February 2018.
73 Denis Healey, ’Speech: Commons Debate on Pay Policy (Government Powers)’ (13
February 1978), 46.
74 Jon, ‘No, Thanks, I’m Already on Mrs Thatcher’s’, (Cartoon), Daily Mail, 2 June 1978.
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was such an unlikely site of resistance compared with the coalmine or
the car-plant.
The stakes were certainly high. Ford negotiations were conducted
early in the cycle, and so, its settlements acted as a marker for pay
rounds elsewhere (Callaghan later called it the ‘bellwether of the
flock’).75 Not only outright breaches of the limits but also ‘private sector
fiddles’ such as dubious productivity agreements or changes to pension
contributions were a major concern, as they risked undermining the
stand the government was taking in the public sector.76 When both
Ford and Vauxhall breached the limit, the internal dispute between the
Treasury and the Department of Employment on the one side and the
Department of Industry on the other, was described by The Economist as
the ‘most recent punch-up’ in a ‘little-publicised battle. . . among senior
cabinet ministers’ over the use of sanctions. In not pursuing either
infraction, the Industry ‘doves’ had won that round.77
Over the same period, the Partnership had found the Treasury rather
more obliging than Employment; the line from officials in the latter
department was consistently inflexible, rejecting the company’s case
that competitive pressures for particular posts had required a corrective
increase. A worked example sent by the Director of Personnel showed
how applying the government guidelines could result in a commission-
based carpet salesman being paid more for the same volume of sales
than a Partner on a higher basic wage; ‘clearly there is no logic or
equity in guidelines that create this sort of disparity in remuneration for
identical work’.78 The Department insisted there was ‘no choice’ but to
record the breach and to inform the Price Commission accordingly.79
The Secretary of State for Employment (Albert Booth) had become ‘the
sole judge of whether a particular pay increase falls inside or outside
the government’s limits’, the Finance Director fumed: ‘This incident is
further evidence, if any were needed that, at least in some areas, the
country is governed by bureaucratic lunatics.’80
It was Roy Hattersley, the Secretary of State for Prices and Consumer
Protection, however, who embodied for the Partnership the contradic-
tions within Labour’s approach to the private sector. In 1969, the then
Chairman (O. Bernard Miller) and Director of Personnel (T.G. Andrews)
had lunch with Hattersley—as Barbara Castle’s deputy at the
Department of Employment—during the discussions on prospective
75 Callaghan, Time and Chance, 534.
76 ‘We’ll Make You Stick to Our Rules’, Economist, 3 December 1977.
77 ‘No Sanctions, No Breakthrough’, Economist, 10 December 1977. The Department of
Employment was later cast as the ‘soft cop’ to the Treasury’s ‘hard cop’: ‘Pay Policy Lists
into Stage Four’, Observer, 12 February 1978.
78 T. G. Andrews, Letter to R. Le Guen, 10 August 1977, Box 2125/a, JLPA.
79 R. Le Guen to T. G. Andrews, 16 August 1977, Box 2125/a, JLPA.
80 Finance Director, Letter to Chairman (P. Lewis), 6 September 1977, Box 2839/f, JLPA.
SECRET LISTS AND SANCTIONS 19 of 26
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/tcbh/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/tcbh/hw
y056/5310009 by guest on 28 M
arch 2019
legislation that followed the publication of the ill-fated industrial
relations White Paper, In Place of Strife.81 Hattersley had provided
welcome confirmation that the Partnership’s arrangements were
‘acceptable as a substitution for normal collective bargaining and
other joint consultative arrangements elsewhere’. The ‘very satisfactory
talk’ even prompted Miller to initiate a programme to ‘develop the
Partnership’s system in all those aspects where it seems least complete
in fulfilling the objectives set out in the White Paper’.82 In 1978,
Hattersley was on the front-line defending the use of sanctions against
the company. Andrews, by then also holding the office of Deputy
Chairman, was invited by Alex Fletcher, MP, to view the Parliamentary
debate of 7 February from the Strangers’ Gallery; a hand-written note of
Hattersley’s ‘lies’ about the Partnership—principally concerning the
company’s knowledge of its blacklisting and alleged hesitancy in
allowing publication to the Commons Library of confidential corres-
pondence with various departments—was afterwards translated into a
formal memorandum for senior staff.83
Hattersley’s interest in promoting models of employee ownership
such as JLP’s was and remained genuine.84 Competition could secure
greater justice and equity within a mixed economy of private- and
socially owned businesses, he argued from his Shadow Cabinet position
in 1980, but the government retained the role of active partner.
Techniques were needed to allow it to challenge ‘individual decisions’
within companies ‘as both forms of enterprise will, from time to time,
wish to pursue policies which are against the national interest’.85 In a
way, Hattersley’s advocacy of both social ownership and state
intervention reflected tensions within the company’s own sense of its
position in the wider economic and political system. Executives wanted
a conducive policy environment, in which the firm’s distinctive
constitution would ensure differentiation of treatment from less
meritorious parts of the private sector. At the same time, their tolerance
for policy intervention was limited; the national interest was a
persuasive appeal, but it would always be superseded by the
considerations of competitive position and congruence with
Partnership principles.
81 ‘In Place of Strife. A Policy for Industrial Relations’, Cmnd 3888 (London, 1969).
82 Chairman (O. Bernard Miller), Letter to Legal Adviser, 5 June 1969, Box 2125/a,
JLPA.
83 General Secretary, Memorandum to All Principal Directors and Heads of Selling
Branches, ‘‘House of Commons Debate—Black List’’, 9 February 1978, Box 2125/a, JLPA.
84 Incidentally, Hattersley’s Principal Private Secretary at the time, Stuart Hampson, left
the civil service in 1982 to join the Partnership, becoming Chairman in 1993.
85 R. Hattersley, ‘Politics and the Mixed Economy’, in E. Roll, ed. The Mixed Economy.
Proceedings of Section F (Economics) of the British Association for the Advancement of Science,
Salford 1980E. Roll (London and Basingstoke, 1982), 126.
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JLP’s new public prominence in early 1978 was particularly
uncomfortable for a company that refrained from advertising its wares
(a position maintained until the 1990s). Executives recognized that the
blacklist reflected far worse on the government than on John Lewis (‘the
longer we are on the list the greater in truth their shame and
embarrassment’) but also clearly felt that the Partnership had special
obligations to raise matters of principle, as illustrated by the instruction
of Counsel.86 The company was anxious to defend a ‘reputation for really
very great regard to the public interest’, while emphasizing—particularly
to internal audiences—that the commercial impact was limited.87 Yet as
letters from Whitehall departments reached purchasing institutions
across the country over the spring and summer, the company’s exposure
to blacklisting through its network of department and grocery stores
became apparent. The nature of the business kept most individual
contract values low; Nottingham University, for example, declined to
forward any further business to Jessop & Son, having awarded the
branch around £4,700 and £4,100 in the two previous years.88 The DHSS
proved particularly diligent. £136 plus Value Added Tax for renovating
venetian blinds at Liverpool’s Princes Park Hospital was withheld from
G H Lee and an increasingly tetchy exchange with officials in Blackpool
and London followed the rejection of a tender by Bainbridge’s in
Newcastle for the supply and dressing of wigs.89
The company also found itself dealing with new contractual terms in
this period. The National Coal Board inserted a provision into tender
documentation, requiring companies to declare their compliance with
government pay policy ‘since it came into operation’.90 This stipulation
would effectively exclude any firm that had been on the secret list, even
if its name had since been removed. The Deputy Chairman’s response
was bullish: submit the tender and strike through the declaration,
endorsing it ‘no longer relevant’ (referring to the expectation, outlined
in the recently published White Paper, Winning the Battle against
Inflation, that contracting parties will make mutual arrangements to
accommodate its guidelines).91 The Partnership’s approach through
86 Chairman (P. Lewis), Letter to Finance Director, 21 March 1978. Box 2125/a, JLPA;
Finance Director, Letter to K. G. Addison, Sun Alliance, 3 February 1978. Box 2125/a, JLPA.
87 T. G. Andrews, verbatim record of comments to Central Council, 6 February 1978.
Box 2125/a, JLPA.
88 Contracts Manager, Jessop & Son, Letter to Managing Director, 30 June 1978. Box
2125/a, JLPA.
89 Contracts Department G. H. Lee, Letter to Contracts Manager G. H. Lee, 20 July
1978. Box 2125/a, JLPA.
90 National Coal Board, Invitation to Tender (12 cu. ft. chest freezer), 17 July 1978, Box
2125/a, JLPA.
91 Deputy Chairman (T. G. Andrews), Letter to Director of Personnel (S.C. May), 21
July 1978, Box 2125/a, JLPA; ‘Winning the Battle against Inflation’, Cmnd 7293 (London,
1978). The White Paper attempted to provide some reassurance that flexibility would be
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1978 was to press on with business as usual, but to pursue tenaciously
any queries or rejections based on the blacklist, however small the
amount involved.
Given the persistent small dents that press and Parliamentary
discussion of the blacklist was making on the government’s political
and economic credibility, it is striking that the policy was not only
sustained but escalated through 1978. Panorama reported that the
number of blacklisted firms had almost doubled between May and July,
from thirty to fifty-six, reaching seventy by August. The inescapable
contexts for this increase in pressure were the fraught negotiations with
the TUC over the proposed 5 per cent limit for Phase 4, finally rejected
on 26 July, and the overarching question of when the Prime Minister
should call a general election. With pay policy and union cooperation
central to Labour’s pitch for power in 1974, these two contexts are
closely interwoven. Indeed, an autumn 1978 election was the subject of
a strategy paper finished on the same day, 22 December 1977, that
Callaghan proposed the 5 per cent norm to his Cabinet.92
The setting of such a low limit seems less a fixed determination than
a signal to an electorate yet to be convinced of Labour’s capacity to
deliver on its economic promises. The uncompromising stance taken by
Healey and Hattersley in the face of widespread criticism and ridicule
of blacklisting made some political sense when seen against this
backdrop; it was expedient to pursue companies that had national
visibility but were low risk in terms of industrial unrest. Further,
sceptics of private sector pay controls within a divided Cabinet were
unlikely to muster against penalties imposed on such firms.93 That is
not to say that JLP was singled out for sanctions, although in late 1976,
concern had already been expressed in emotive terms that the
government would find ways of ‘punishing’ the Partnership for pay
policy breaches, even as far as going ‘out of its way to make life
difficult for [us]’).94 Yet the correspondence from officials speaks of
administrative punctiliousness confounded by the opacities and
confusions of the policy itself (more ‘Whitehall bumbledom than
malevolence’, as one official was quoted in the Observer).95 Strategic
disregard—of the weaknesses of the government’s case and of obvious
built into this phase of the pay policy, asking ‘employers and unions to act responsibly
and moderately’ (paragraph 25).
92 Donoughue, Downing Street Diary, 279. In mid-October, Callaghan had mentioned
planning for an autumn 1978 or summer 1979 election ‘but of course we might be forced
into one sooner’, 245; Dorey, Wage Politics in Britain, 159.
93 Donoughue did not consider the JLP or Sun Alliance blacklisting controversies worth
mentioning in his diary.
94 Finance Director, Memorandum to General Secretary for Members of the PEC, ‘Pay
Review 1977, 8 December 1976, Box 2839/f, JLPA.
95 ‘Pay Policy Lists into Stage Four’.
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inconsistencies in the selection of firms to be penalized—rather than the
pursuit of a particular grievance ensured that John Lewis continued to
be blacklisted into the autumn of 1978. Sanctions against the company
did not cease until December; formal notification from the Treasury
arrived 2 days after the government’s Commons defeat.
III
Incomes policy thus commanded the energies and imagination not just
of policymakers but also of businesspeople. The burden on JLP
executives was onerous not least because it involved them in managing
a series of conflicting conversations: with Partners already sensitized to
internal pay differentials and concerned about standards of living in a
low-wage sector; with officials about the integrity of JLP pay policy and
questions of principle, public interest, and the conduct of government
business; and among themselves about operating in an unsettled policy
climate and managing the competing claims on their limited room for
manoeuvre. Indeed, the blacklisting episode of 1977–8 shows how
constrained both business and government were in implementing
policy as conceived despite powerful beliefs about the legitimacy of
their actions.
The Partnership had been conceived by Spedan Lewis as a ‘state
within a state’, bound by the laws of the land but otherwise free to
realize its constitutional purpose as a communal enterprise dedicated to
advancing the happiness of its members.96 This ‘independence of
initiative’ had allowed the company to experiment in pursuit of its
aims, such as developing models of assistance for Partners where the
government fell short. Lewis was particularly proud, for example, of
the introduction of Family Allowances in 1940, five years before the
equivalent Act of Parliament.97 These experiments in pay, benefits, and
‘amenities’—the additional means by which the Partnership sought to
secure the happiness of its members, such as an improved working
environment, social and leisure provision, medical care, and adult
education—had been a feature of the company from the time he took
over management of Peter Jones. The architects of such plans were
what he called the ‘brain-workers’: the executive class of the business.
Lewis argued strongly for such Partners to be paid ‘handsomely’ and
that it was in the interests of the ‘workers’ to do so. He made the case
in characteristically overblown terms: ‘If to possessors of really good
96 Lewis, Partnership for All, 209–10.
97 ‘Partnership on the Scale of Modern Industry’, Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, 89
(1941), 653–66. On Council’s decision to introduce Family Allowances, see Gazette,
Summary of the Proceedings of the Council at its 132nd meeting, 27 July 1940, 528–9.
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brains the professions of trade-unionism and of labour-politics had been
as financially attractive as the Law, the Dictators would not have been
allowed to ruin Europe’.98
To find this freedom of action curtailed, as it was through the
blacklisting of 1977–8, was therefore not just, and arguably not
primarily, a commercial threat. Blacklisting revealed the limitations of
the Partnership’s ‘state within a state’ by demonstrating the company’s
exposure to exogenous contingencies despite the apparent integrity of
the Partnership system and its institutional arrangements.99 Strategies
may be devised and decisions taken in alignment with JLP principles
and practices, but those initiatives were no less vulnerable to external
pressure than was the case for other private-sector businesses.
Executives trained in a system that conferred on them the status of
Cabinet ministers were finding their ability to exercise power
circumscribed. This was as much an issue for internal as for external
relations. In 1975, at a time the executive was sympathetic to the aims,
if not the means, of government pay controls, managers were being
enjoined to avoid ‘any implication’, whether in print or in speech, ‘that
the Partnership cannot do this or that because of Government
restrictions’.100 Wide public knowledge of the company’s blacklisting
in early 1978 ensured that this ongoing struggle to assert the company’s
independence of initiative—and in pay of all areas—became more
complex and urgent.
For the Callaghan government, the blacklisting episode was a very
public demonstration of the gap between policy conception and
implementation. Departments manifested varying levels of commitment
in pushing sanction demands through to dependent agencies and
organizations, which in turn adopted different attitudes to enforcement.
The government found local authorities, for example, unwilling to
withhold tender invitations from blacklisted firms.101 No pretence of a
national policy could be maintained; some businesses—Ford, Vauxhall,
and British Oxygen, among others—were proved to be more equal than
others. Once the support of the unions had gone for Phase 3, the
government could only target those employers willing to pay above the
limit; then ‘self-interest encouraged the workers to rally to the bosses’
98 Partnership for All, 229.
99 Spedan Lewis used the language of political systems to describe the Partnership,
referring to, for example, representative institutions and an independent judiciary, and
also used the analogy of a democratic state as an explanatory device. See, for example,
Fairer Shares: A Possible Advance in Civilisation and Perhaps the Ony Alternative to
Communism, 91.
100 Director of Personnel, Memorandum to Heads of Branches and Principal Directors of
Central Departments, ‘Publicity on Pay’, 16 October 1975, Box 2839/f, JLPA.
101 ‘‘A Little Local Difficulty’’, publication unknown. Clipping in Box 2125/e, JLPA.
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cause’, as Hattersley later commented.102 In this context, companies
such as John Lewis, and the smaller firms that made up the bulk of the
blacklist, offered a more realistic prospect for effective sanctions (as one
Partner put it, ‘companies which cannot hit back’)103 than large
businesses with relatively well-organized workforces and a claim to
national economic consequence.
The argument had already been made by the advent of the
Callaghan blacklist that the imposition of penalties was itself a signal of
policy failure.104 And, indeed, another lesson of the 1960s had already
been drawn by this point: that sanctions were not a statement of intent
but a symbol of government resolve. Given the ‘very narrow limits to
the support legal powers can give on incomes policy’, authority cannot
be invested in enforcement; instead, governments may only invoke an
image of determination, which also serves ‘to assure the public that
flagrant breaches can be highlighted’.105 In practice, the attempt to
impose sanctions on firms such as John Lewis in the first half of 1978
undermined the Callaghan government’s political and economic
credibility before the crisis moment of the Ford settlement as
Labour’s flagship policy buckled under its own inconsistencies. It
also, however, exposed tensions and fragilities within JLP that may not
have been publicly visible as were those of the government but
nonetheless challenged the Partnership’s sense of itself. Confusions in
the press between Phase 1 and Phase 2 breaches prompted questions
from Partners about the legitimacy of raising senior pay over that of the
rank and file, and executives were pressed to defend a system of
reward that represented an accommodation of market forces and co-
ownership.
In bringing the business perspective into the policy picture, the case
of John Lewis’s ’blacking’ adds some shading to our understanding of
the politics of pay in this important moment. We can see how formal
arrangements—legislative measures, voluntary codes and norms,
company policies, and so on—designed to secure and to signal
consistency and fairness can be confounded. Disjunctures between
ostensible equity in policy and perceived inequity in practice proved
particularly damaging and divisive in the case of pay (and they
arguably remain so). Insights into how businesses approached,
negotiated with, and responded to government by drawing on
company archives can enhance the work of political historians
interested in the design and implementation of policy and the role
102 Roy Hattersley, Who Goes Home? Scenes from a Political Life (London, 2017), 197–8.
103 Letter from ‘Unsigned’, Gazette, 4 March, 1978, 106.
104 Clegg, How to Run an Incomes Policy, 57–8.
105 John Corina and A J Meyrick, Incomes Policy in Crisis: An Overview, 1973-4 (Oxford,
1974), 10.
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and reach of government. Business records present certain challenges
for historical analysis but also offer distinctive qualities that are rarely
considered.106 With the careful critical handling that scholarly training
fosters, company archives hold the promise of rich resources for
political historians.
106 Christopher Kobrak and Andrea Schneider, ‘Varieties of Business History: Subject
and Methods for the Twenty-First Century,’ Business History, 53 (2011), 412.
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